Rational Behavior with Deficient Foresight
The Keynesian notion that economic decision making is subject to fundamental uncertainty (as opposed to probabilistic risk) is often dismissed by contemporary economists using familiar arguments about the presumed rationality of the expectations formation process. The paper argues that this line of reasoning is invalid. The key issues involved do not concern the rationality, or otherwise, of economic agents, at least as the term "rational" seems to be understood by the majority of economists, but lie elsewhere.
Volume (Year): 14 (1988)
Issue (Month): 3 (Jul-Sep)
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- Shackle, G L S, 1973. "Keynes and Today's Establishment in Economic Theory: A View," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 516-19, June.
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