Taming tardiness in parking reservations: an auction-based framework integrating driver feedback mechanism

Reservation parking systems improve space utilization but suffer efficiency losses due to late driver arrivals, which create idle capacity. To address this pre-demand disturbance, this paper proposes a novel auction-based framework that integrates a strategic driver tardiness feedback mechanism. Based on this feedback, the platform initiates a multi-stage Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction when appropriate, allocating rewards or penalties according to driver behavior and system competition. We develop a game-theoretic model to analyze the strategic interactions between drivers and the platform under complete and incomplete information. Our analysis reveals that the Nash equilibrium and the platform’s optimal strategy critically depend on the reward value, and that under incomplete information, a driver’s expected utility is negatively correlated with the perceived probability of competitor presence. Numerical experiments demonstrate that the proposed mechanism effectively mitigates utility fluctuations caused by delays. The mechanism can deliver a triple-win under moderate-to-high disturbance and sufficient competition: higher driver utility, increased platform revenue, and enhanced overall parking space utilization and social welfare.