Modeling cross-border data transfer strategies for platform multinational companies

This paper explores the optimal cross-border data transfer strategy for platform multinational companies (PMNCs). Using differential game theory, we model and compare three strategies: (i) a Nash non-cooperative game strategy, in which the government sets regulatory rules and PMNCs independently carry out cross-border data transfer; (ii) a Stackelberg leader-follower game strategy, in which the government plays a dominant role and uses subsidies to incentivize PMNCs to conduct cross-border data transfer; (iii) a cooperative game strategy, in which the government and PMNCs form a coalition to negotiate cross-border data transfer. The models incorporate the negative externalities of data elements, the value of cross-border data transfer, and the time factor. We study the optimal cross-border data transfer strategy and analyze the impact of key parameters on government and PMNCs decisions. The study reveals that: (1) The cooperative strategy between the government and PMNCs is the optimal option for cross-border data transfer management. (2) Government subsidies significantly promote cross-border data transfer for PMNCs and increase government revenue in turn. (3) Negative externalities generally hinder cross-border data transfer, while higher cross-border data transfer value stimulates this activity. The revenue distribution coefficient affects outcomes vary across different strategies. This study provides a theoretical foundation and practical guidance for PMNCs to determine their cross-border data transfer decisions and for governments to design effective regulatory and subsidy policies.