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Do staggered boards benefit the environment? A plant-level analysis

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  • Do, Trung K.

Abstract

This study provides evidence demonstrating a negative relationship between the implementation of staggered boards, designed to safeguard managers against the corporate control market, and the occurrence of toxic chemical releases. By examining a quasi-natural experiment facilitated by a 1990 law enforcing staggered boards for Massachusetts-incorporated firms, we ascertain that the compulsory adoption of staggered boards leads to a significant reduction in toxic emissions. Our findings suggest that staggered boards are more effective in reducing emissions when managers have greater job security. Additionally, the impact is stronger in younger firms and those with superior governance practices. Overall, these results align with the long-term perspective that staggered boards can promote.

Suggested Citation

  • Do, Trung K., 2025. "Do staggered boards benefit the environment? A plant-level analysis," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 101(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:reveco:v:101:y:2025:i:c:s105905602500351x
    DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2025.104188
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Staggered board; Toxic releases; Environmental performance; Massachusetts;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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