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When free-riding on contributing to an impurely shared good decreases with greater concentration of interests

Author

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  • Hennessy, David A.
  • Li, Jian

Abstract

While a well-developed conceptual foundation for understanding underinvestment in shared goods exists, how heterogeneity in interests among a group affects expenditures relative to the socially optimal level has received little scrutiny. We show that i) the majorization partial ordering is an appropriate way to think about heterogeneous interests, and ii) reasonable technologies exist where more concentration decreases expenditure at the intensive margin, i.e., when all group members spend. However, greater concentration of interests eventually leads to greater aggregate expenditure because the least interested cease spending, leaving the burden entirely on those with most interest.

Suggested Citation

  • Hennessy, David A. & Li, Jian, 2026. "When free-riding on contributing to an impurely shared good decreases with greater concentration of interests," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 142(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:142:y:2026:i:c:s0165489626000570
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2026.102550
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    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

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