Information projection and selective search: Implement now or draw again

We study how interpersonal information projection bias influences a researcher’s decision to implement a current idea or to continue drawing new ones. Consistent misbeliefs, such as overconfidence or underconfidence, distort beliefs in a fixed manner. In contrast, information projection creates state-dependent beliefs: before an idea arises, the researcher is optimistic about its uniqueness, and once the idea is in hand, the researcher becomes pessimistic. This fluctuation makes implementation less attractive and makes repeated searches more appealing. Our analysis yields two key findings. First, compared to any consistent-misbelief researcher whose fixed belief falls between the optimistic and pessimistic assessments of the information projection researcher, the information projection researcher is more selective: implementing less, drawing more ideas, and quitting less frequently. Second, at sufficiently high performance thresholds, researchers who end up passing the threshold are disproportionately information projection researchers. Consequently, information projection systematically biases both individual search dynamics and the composition of such researchers.