Fishery cooperatives and the Pacific Whiting Conservation Cooperative: Lessons and application to non-industrial fisheries in the Western Pacific

The last 20 years have seen a fundamental shift in fishery management from reliance on open access and regulated open access to systems based on individual user rights. In some cases, the allocation of harvest rights to defined harvest or community sectors has served as a catalyst to drive the formation of voluntary agreements among fishermen in creating self-governed systems of catch shares. A number of voluntary cooperatives including the Pacific Whiting Conservation Cooperative – which served as the model for the American Fisheries Act – provide examples of self-governing systems which have successfully achieved management objectives including greater economic performance, equity, and conservation. Cooperative arrangements have functioned to devolve some of the responsibilities of management to the cooperative – allowing fishermen greater operational flexibility in achieving individual or community goals, while reducing the burden of management on formal managing bodies. Analysis of voluntary cooperatives shows that their success is based on the existence of certain core conditions including relatively small homogeneous groups of players, secure sector-allocated and divisible rights, and the ability to form binding contracts among coop members. Cooperatives, however, face a number of internal and external threats that can undermine their success and existence. Whether voluntary or designed through regulation, cooperatives may be a promising approach for addressing challenges in non-industrial fisheries in the United States including the Western Pacific – especially if coupled with user rights based on geography, territory, and culture. However, the sheer geographical size and cultural diversity of regions such as the Western Pacific suggests that no single approach may be appropriate throughout the entire region.