The mechanism and optimization of contract matching between new agricultural entities and agricultural land transfer model: A cost-benefit and game analysis

Given the long-term tight balance of food security in China, agricultural land transfer (ALT) is a pivotal measure. However, the ALT practice has fallen into a predicament of “quantitative growth without qualitative improvement” over the past decade. The core crux lies in the lack of theoretical guidance for contract selection between new agricultural management entities (NAE) and rural households, as well as the ambiguous regulatory boundaries of government intervention and subsidies. In this study, the matching logic between different ALT contract models and NAE are examined based on cost-benefit and game analyses. The mediation effects of transaction costs and value-added benefits in the matching path are analyzed. Focusing on the fixed-rent contract model, the moderating mechanisms of government administrative intervention and policy subsidy are explored to optimize the matching mechanism. The findings are: (1) The matching mechanism is driven by the inherent characteristics of NAE. NAE with larger operational scales and higher technical levels, stable cash flows and risk-averse tendencies, and strong value-added capacity match the ideal, fixed-rent, and secondary income contract models, respectively. (2) A higher degree of matching brings greater savings in transaction costs and a more equitable distribution of value-added benefits, which increases the net income of both NAE and rural households. (3) On the premise of unchanged land use, the matching mechanism can be optimized by government intervention (“land consolidation coupled with tax reductions” and “rental price guidelines combined with tax payment on behalf of relevant parties”) and policy subsidy (demand guidance + premium distribution).