Existence and dynamic consistency of Nash equilibrium with non-expected utility preferences
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, 1986. "How to License Intangible Property," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 101(3), pages 567-589.
- Sudipto Bhattacharya & Dilip Mookherjee, 1986. "Portfolio Choice in Research and Development," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(4), pages 594-605, Winter.
- Sudipto Bhattacharya & Jay R. Ritter, 1983. "Innovation and Communication: Signalling with Partial Disclosure," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(2), pages 331-346.
- Ordover, Janusz A & Willig, Robert D, 1985. "Antitrust for High-Technology Industries: Assessing Research Joint Ventures and Mergers," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(2), pages 311-333, May.
- Christopher Harris & John Vickers, 1987. "Racing with Uncertainty," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(1), pages 1-21.
- Raaj Kumar Sah & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1987.
"The Invariance of Market Innovation to the Number of Firms,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, pages 98-108.
- Raaj Kumar Sah & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1986. "The Invariance of R&D to the Number of Firms in the Industry," NBER Working Papers 1798, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- repec:hoo:wpaper:e-89-2 is not listed on IDEAS
- Michael L. Katz, 1986. "An Analysis of Cooperative Research and Development," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(4), pages 527-543, Winter.
- Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Glazer, Jacob & Sappington, David E M, 1990. "Sharing Productive Knowledge in Internally Financed R&D Contests," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(2), pages 187-208, December.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Bram Driesen & Andrés Perea & Hans Peters, 2010. "On Loss Aversion in Bimatrix Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, pages 367-391.
- Volij, Oscar, 2002. "A remark on bargaining and non-expected utility," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 17-24, September.
- Kin Chung Lo, 1999.
"Nash equilibrium without mutual knowledge of rationality,"
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 14(3), pages 621-633.
- Kin Chung Lo, 1995. "Nash Equilibrium without Mutual Knowledge of Rationality," Working Papers ecpap-95-04, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Karni, Edi & Safra, Zvi, 2000. "An extension of a theorem of von Neumann and Morgenstern with an application to social choice theory," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 315-327, November.
- Lo, Kin Chung, 1996. "Equilibrium in Beliefs under Uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 443-484, November.
- Marinacci, Massimo, 2000. "Ambiguous Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 191-219, May.
- Alexander Zimper, 2007. "Strategic games with security and potential level players," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 63(1), pages 53-78, August.
- Fershtman, Chaim & Safra, Zvi & Vincent, Daniel, 1991. "Delayed agreements and nonexpected utility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 423-437, November.
- Dorian Beauchêne, 2016. "Solution concepts for games with ambiguous payoffs," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 80(2), pages 245-269, February.
- Epstein, Larry G., 1997. "Preference, Rationalizability and Equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 1-29, March.
- Rindone, Fabio & Greco, Salvatore & Di Gaetano, Luigi, 2013. "On prospects and games: an equilibrium analysis under prospect theory," MPRA Paper 52131, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- J. C. R. Alcantud & Carlos Alós-Ferrer, 2002. "Choice-Nash Equilibria," Vienna Economics Papers 0209, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- Azrieli, Yaron & Teper, Roee, 2011.
"Uncertainty aversion and equilibrium existence in games with incomplete information,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 310-317.
- Azrieli, Yaron & Teper, Roee, 2009. "Uncertainty aversion and equilibrium existence in games with incomplete information," MPRA Paper 17617, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Rieger, Marc Oliver, 2014. "Evolutionary stability of prospect theory preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 1-11.
- Grant, Simon & Kajii, Atsushi & Polak, Ben, 2001. ""Third down with a yard to go": recursive expected utility and the Dixit-Skeath conundrum," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 73(3), pages 275-286, December.
More about this item
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:55:y:1991:i:2:p:229-246. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869 .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.