Equilibrium in dynamic models with an infinity of agents
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- Green, Jerry & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1977. "Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(2), pages 427-438, March.
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- Hurwicz, Leonid & Schmeidler, David, 1978. "Construction of Outcome Functions Guaranteeing Existence and Pareto Optimality of Nash Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(6), pages 1447-1474, November.
- Mueller, Dennis C., 1978. "Voting by veto," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 57-75, August.
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- Peleg, Bezalel, 1978. "Consistent Voting Systems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(1), pages 153-161, January.
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