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Consistent approval-based multi-winner rules

Author

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  • Lackner, Martin
  • Skowron, Piotr

Abstract

This paper is an axiomatic study of consistent approval-based committee (ABC) rules. These are multi-winner voting rules that select a committee, i.e., a fixed-size group of candidates, based on approval ballots. We introduce the class of ABC scoring rules and provide an axiomatic characterization of this class based on the consistency axiom. Building upon this result, we axiomatically characterize three important consistent multi-winner rules: Proportional Approval Voting, Multi-Winner Approval Voting and the Approval Chamberlin–Courant rule. Our results demonstrate the variety of ABC scoring rules and illustrate three different, orthogonal principles that multi-winner voting rules may represent: proportionality, diversity, and individual excellence.

Suggested Citation

  • Lackner, Martin & Skowron, Piotr, 2021. "Consistent approval-based multi-winner rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 192(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:192:y:2021:i:c:s0022053120301666
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105173
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Chris Dong & Patrick Lederer, 2023. "Refined Characterizations of Approval-based Committee Scoring Rules," Papers 2312.08799, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2024.
    2. Brandl, Florian & Peters, Dominik, 2022. "Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: A catalogue of characterizations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
    3. Ritu Dutta & Rajnish Kumnar & Surajit Borkotokey, 2023. "How to choose a Compatible Committee?," Papers 2308.03507, arXiv.org.
    4. Martin Bullinger & Chris Dong & Patrick Lederer & Clara Mehler, 2023. "Participation Incentives in Approval-Based Committee Elections," Papers 2312.08798, arXiv.org.
    5. Florian Brandl & Felix Brandt, 2023. "A Robust Characterization of Nash Equilibrium," Papers 2307.03079, arXiv.org.
    6. Chris Dong & Patrick Lederer, 2023. "Characterizations of Sequential Valuation Rules," Papers 2302.11890, arXiv.org.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Axiomatic characterization; Approval voting; Proportionality;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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