Beyond the last term: Analyzing politicians’ responsiveness in a no-term-limit context

We investigate the willingness of politicians in the German Bundestag to interact with voters, drawing on data capturing direct interchanges between citizens and their elected representatives to measure their responsiveness. In a setting without term limits, we examine whether electoral incentives influence politicians’ engagement with citizens. Our theoretical model predicts, and empirical results confirm, that politicians who are not seeking reelection become less responsive to voters, especially as election day approaches. This decline is attributed to a behavioral response resulting from a decrease in intra-party standing, rather than to a change in motivation or personal ideological convictions. Politicians retiring due to age or health reasons maintain consistent levels of interaction with voters, in contrast to those leaving due to pressure within their party or due to career changes, who exhibit decreased engagement with voters. Our findings offer novel insights into the role of incentives and constraints for political behavior in countries without mandatory term limits.