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Dynamic returns to political tenure

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  • Machielsen, Bas

Abstract

Economists frequently assert that politicians derive financial returns from a political career, but these returns can be obscured by the varying duration of political careers. In this study, I estimate the financial returns associated with successive mandates in the Lower House, capitalizing on the repetitive treatment assignment through close elections in the Netherlands from 1848–1917. Employing a dynamic regression discontinuity framework, I establish that the financial benefits accruing to politicians are due to the first two periods of political tenure, but no substantial returns emerge during the more advanced career stages. These findings emphasize that politicians elected for a first and second term exhibit significantly higher end-of-life wealth than their losing counterparts, equivalent to several years’ salaries. I also explore various potential mechanisms, providing evidence in favor of career-based explanations and against in-office returns.

Suggested Citation

  • Machielsen, Bas, 2026. "Dynamic returns to political tenure," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 732-748.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:54:y:2026:i:3:p:732-748
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2026.03.002
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    JEL classification:

    • N14 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - Europe: 1913-
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue

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