IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/finana/v105y2025ics1057521925004934.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Resignation of independent directors, restructuring of political ties, and the introduction of state-owned capital in private enterprises: Evidence from China

Author

Listed:
  • Wei, Cao
  • Wei, Xu
  • Can, Zhao

Abstract

This study examines the role of independent directors with government backgrounds in facilitating the introduction of state-owned capital into private enterprises, focusing on the restructuring of political connections. The findings reveal that the resignation of these directors significantly accelerates the integration of state-owned capital, particularly when the director is a government official with strong ties to the company's location or industry. The effect is most pronounced in firms with greater financing constraints, weaker political connections, and those operating in regions with unfavorable business environments and high policy uncertainty. Furthermore, the study highlights that restructuring political connections helps private enterprises access critical resources, such as bank loans and government subsidies, enhancing their operational resilience.

Suggested Citation

  • Wei, Cao & Wei, Xu & Can, Zhao, 2025. "Resignation of independent directors, restructuring of political ties, and the introduction of state-owned capital in private enterprises: Evidence from China," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 105(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:finana:v:105:y:2025:i:c:s1057521925004934
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2025.104406
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1057521925004934
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.irfa.2025.104406?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:finana:v:105:y:2025:i:c:s1057521925004934. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/620166 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.