IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/empfin/v83y2025ics092753982500057x.html

Strategic implications of corporate disclosure via Twitter

Author

Listed:
  • Kale, Devendra
  • Nanda, Vikram
  • Rupp, Anin

Abstract

We investigate the information and strategic aspects of corporate tweets. Despite limits on message length, tweets stimulate information acquisition by investors, as indicated by post-tweet downloads from the SEC-EDGAR website. Corporations appear to be effective at leveraging tweets to enhance their information environment. Specifically, tweets are associated with reduction in firms’ earnings surprise and stock return volatility. There is a decrease in negative skewness of stock returns, suggesting a more uniform release of favorable and unfavorable news, especially in high litigation industries. These effects are more evident when the CEO has greater equity incentives and when firms are smaller and less visible.

Suggested Citation

  • Kale, Devendra & Nanda, Vikram & Rupp, Anin, 2025. "Strategic implications of corporate disclosure via Twitter," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:empfin:v:83:y:2025:i:c:s092753982500057x
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jempfin.2025.101635
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S092753982500057X
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jempfin.2025.101635?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Chen, Joseph & Hong, Harrison & Stein, Jeremy C., 2001. "Forecasting crashes: trading volume, past returns, and conditional skewness in stock prices," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 345-381, September.
    2. Myers, Stewart C. & Majluf, Nicholas S., 1984. "Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 187-221, June.
    3. Harrison Hong & Jeremy C. Stein, 1999. "A Unified Theory of Underreaction, Momentum Trading, and Overreaction in Asset Markets," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(6), pages 2143-2184, December.
    4. Francis, J & Philbrick, D & Schipper, K, 1994. "Shareholder Litigation And Corporate Disclosures," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 32(2), pages 137-164.
    5. Coles, Jeffrey L. & Daniel, Naveen D. & Naveen, Lalitha, 2006. "Managerial incentives and risk-taking," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 431-468, February.
    6. Anders Ekholm & Daniel Pasternack, 2005. "The negative news threshold—An explanation for negative skewness in stock returns," The European Journal of Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(6), pages 511-529.
    7. Holmstrom, Bengt & Tirole, Jean, 1993. "Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(4), pages 678-709, August.
    8. Chiu, Peng-Chia & Teoh, Siew Hong & Zhang, Yinglei & Huang, Xuan, 2023. "Using Google searches of firm products to detect revenue management," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    9. Lian Fen Lee & Amy P. Hutton & Susan Shu, 2015. "The Role of Social Media in the Capital Market: Evidence from Consumer Product Recalls," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 53(2), pages 367-404, May.
    10. Natalie Burford & Andrew V. Shipilov & Nathan R. Furr, 2022. "How ecosystem structure affects firm performance in response to a negative shock to interdependencies," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(1), pages 30-57, January.
    11. Brett Trueman, 1997. "Managerial Disclosures and Shareholder Litigation," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 181-199, June.
    12. Armstrong, Christopher S. & Vashishtha, Rahul, 2012. "Executive stock options, differential risk-taking incentives, and firm value," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 70-88.
    13. Low, Angie, 2009. "Managerial risk-taking behavior and equity-based compensation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3), pages 470-490, June.
    14. Michael S. Drake & Darren T. Roulstone & Jacob R. Thornock, 2012. "Investor Information Demand: Evidence from Google Searches Around Earnings Announcements," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 50(4), pages 1001-1040, September.
    15. Joshua Livnat & Richard R. Mendenhall, 2006. "Comparing the Post–Earnings Announcement Drift for Surprises Calculated from Analyst and Time Series Forecasts," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 44(1), pages 177-205, March.
    16. Alex Edmans & Itay Goldstein & Wei Jiang, 2015. "Feedback Effects, Asymmetric Trading, and the Limits to Arbitrage," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(12), pages 3766-3797, December.
    17. John Core & Wayne Guay, 2002. "Estimating the Value of Employee Stock Option Portfolios and Their Sensitivities to Price and Volatility," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 40(3), pages 613-630, June.
    18. Kim, Irene & Skinner, Douglas J., 2012. "Measuring securities litigation risk," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 290-310.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Chakraborty, Atreya & Gao, Lucia Silva & Sheikh, Shahbaz, 2019. "Managerial risk taking incentives, corporate social responsibility and firm risk," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 58-72.
    2. Francis, Bill B. & Hasan, Iftekhar & Hunter, Delroy M. & Zhu, Yun, 2017. "Do managerial risk-taking incentives influence firms' exchange rate exposure?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 154-169.
    3. Blanco, Iván & García, Sergio J., 2021. "Options trading and the cost of debt," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    4. Chengru Hu & Wei Jiang, 2019. "Managerial risk incentives and accounting conservatism," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 781-813, April.
    5. Islam, Emdad & Rahman, Lubna, 2023. "Shades of grey: Risk-related agency conflicts and corporate innovation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    6. Hong, Jieying, 2019. "Managerial compensation incentives and corporate debt maturity: Evidence from FAS 123R," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 388-414.
    7. Guanming He, 2015. "The effect of CEO inside debt holdings on financial reporting quality," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 501-536, March.
    8. Wruck, Karen H. & Wu, YiLin, 2021. "The relation between CEO equity incentives and the quality of accounting disclosures: New evidence," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    9. Li, Yiwei & Zeng, Yeqin, 2019. "The impact of top executive gender on asset prices: Evidence from stock price crash risk," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 528-550.
    10. Mazur, Mieszko & Salganik-Shoshan, Galla, 2017. "Teaming up and quiet intervention: The impact of institutional investors on executive compensation policies," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 65-83.
    11. Mazur, Mieszko & Salganik-Shoshan, Galla, 2019. "The effect of executive stock option delta and vega on the spin-off decision," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 132-144.
    12. Dai, Han & Robinson, Dahlia & Shen, Yi, 2025. "CEO-employee pay disparity, risk-taking incentives, and financial reporting choices," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    13. Chen, Jie & Su, Xunhua & Tian, Xuan & Xu, Bin, 2022. "Does customer-base structure influence managerial risk-taking incentives?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 462-483.
    14. Armstrong, Christopher S. & Larcker, David F. & Ormazabal, Gaizka & Taylor, Daniel J., 2013. "The relation between equity incentives and misreporting: The role of risk-taking incentives," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 327-350.
    15. Kieschnick, Robert & Shi, Wenyun, 2023. "Spillover effects in managerial compensation," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 62-73.
    16. Durongkadej, Isarin & Wei, Siqi & Rao, Ramesh, 2021. "Shareholder litigation and the risk incentive effect of executive compensation: A re-examination," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 41(C).
    17. Armstrong, Christopher S. & Vashishtha, Rahul, 2012. "Executive stock options, differential risk-taking incentives, and firm value," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 70-88.
    18. J. Samuel Baixauli-Soler & Maria Belda-Ruiz & Gregorio Sanchez-Marin, 2017. "An executive hierarchy analysis of stock options: Does gender matter?," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 737-766, October.
    19. Humphery-Jenner, Mark & Islam, Emdad & Nanda, Vikram & Rahman, Lubna, 2025. "Incentive contracting in the shadow of litigation risk: Evidence from universal demand laws," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 171(C).
    20. Francis, Bill B. & Hasan, Iftekhar & Hunter, Delroy M. & Zhu, Yun, 2017. "Do managerial risk-taking incentives influence firms' exchange rate exposure?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 154-169.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:empfin:v:83:y:2025:i:c:s092753982500057x. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jempfin .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.