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Erratum to: "Annuitization and asset allocation": [Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 31 (9) (2007) 3138-3177]

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  • Milevsky, Moshe A.
  • Young, Virginia R.

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  • Milevsky, Moshe A. & Young, Virginia R., 2008. "Erratum to: "Annuitization and asset allocation": [Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 31 (9) (2007) 3138-3177]," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(11), pages 3743-3744, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:32:y:2008:i:11:p:3743-3744
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    References listed on IDEAS

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