Voter-buying, politician selection, and public good provision in Brazil

I study the consequences of voter-buying, defined as the act of inducing outsiders to fraudulently transfer their voter registration across jurisdictions in exchange for private benefits. Specifically, I explore the effects of Brazil’s 2007 voter re-registration reform which was intended to curb voter-buying. Exploiting a discontinuity in the targeting of municipalities assigned to the reform, I examine the response of mayoral elections, public expenditures and socioeconomic outcomes to the imposition of exogenous barriers to voter-buying. The reform led to an increase in political competition, and positive politician selection. Educated and qualified candidates who are less likely to belong to clientelist parties are more likely to enter and win mayoral elections. These political changes induce a rise in healthcare and school expenditures — programmatic public goods salient to poor voters. These increased expenditures result in better health outcomes, including reduced infant mortality, and better schooling inputs, including more schools, teachers, and student enrollment. Exploration of underlying mechanisms confirms that positive politician selection and changes to the electorate composition are the key drivers of the results. I also show that unintended disenfranchisement and incumbent reputation effects are not driving the results.