Coevolution of opinion, strategy, and structure on temporal hypergraphs

Real-world cooperative behavior is typically embedded in higher-order group interactions, individual cognitive heterogeneity, and dynamic relationship reorganization. However, existing models rarely capture the joint effects of these three mechanisms within a unified framework. In this paper, we propose an opinion–strategy–structure synergistic coevolution model on temporal hypergraphs, in which individuals participate in public goods games within higher-order groups, opinions are jointly driven by social influence, strategic feedback, and payoff reinforcement, strategies are updated under the combined effects of the global opinion climate, local cooperation ratio, and payoff levels; and the interaction structure is adaptively rewired through a payoff-driven exit and opinion-similarity-based entry mechanism. Within this unified framework, we further compare three coupling schemes, namely the constant-opinion scheme, the opinion-guided scheme, and the mutual-influence scheme, and investigate the resulting system dynamics through numerical simulations. The results show that, compared with the constant-opinion and opinion-guided cases, bidirectional cognitive–behavioral coupling markedly enhances the cooperation level, accelerates system convergence, and drives the system more rapidly toward a high-opinion–high-cooperation steady state. Moreover, the proposed model enables the synchronous convergence of high cooperation and cognitive consensus over a broad parameter range, thereby offering a new theoretical perspective for understanding the coordinated evolution of cooperation and public opinion in real social systems.