The impact of cyber-attacks on cybersecurity investment game model

The increasing complexity and frequency of cyberattacks present significant challenges for organizations, emphasizing the need for strategic cybersecurity investments. Given the interdependent nature of cybersecurity, collaborative investment strategies enable organizations to pool resources and enhance collective resilience. This paper introduces a game-theoretic model based on a public goods framework to examine cooperative cybersecurity investments under varying levels of cyberattack risk. The model captures the decision-making process of multiple agents (e.g., firms, organizations, or individuals) as they determine whether and how much to invest in shared cybersecurity defense. A key feature of our approach is the incorporation of cyberattack risk as a determinant of cooperation, reflecting real-world uncertainty in cyber threat severity and likelihood. We also examine how network topology shapes both cybersecurity investment decisions and vulnerability to attacks. Our analysis identifies the conditions that promote cooperation, the factors that influence investment levels, and how risk perception and network structure together affect strategic choices. Our findings provide insights into effective cybersecurity investment strategies in interdependent security environments.