Synergistic dynamics of social learning and collective decision-making: Moderate social pressure enhances collective performance

Although the influence of social learning on collective decision-making has been extensively studied, the role of the resulting social pressure in shaping decision dynamics is often overlooked. This pressure not only prompts individuals to follow the majority, thereby reinforcing group inertia and stifling innovation; more significantly, it drives social learners to adaptively adjust their learning strategies, thereby reshaping the co-evolutionary dynamics between social learning and collective decision-making. To this end, we have constructed an evolutionary game model based on collective action, analysing the impact of the relative advantages of options, learning costs, and social pressure. Theoretical analysis demonstrates that social learning patterns dominate phase transitions in system equilibria, revealing the necessary conditions for bistable emergence. Spatially structured Monte Carlo simulations further reveal that when the benefit-to-cost ratio of collective action exceeds a critical threshold, moderate social pressure can spontaneously evolve into an effective coordination mechanism - even in the absence of explicit coordination - ensuring social learners achieve higher long-term decision accuracy than individual learners.