IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/apmaco/v508y2026ics0096300325003534.html

Trust AI regulation? Discerning users are vital to build trust and effective AI regulation

Author

Listed:
  • Alalawi, Zainab
  • Bova, Paolo
  • Cimpeanu, Theodor
  • Di Stefano, Alessandro
  • Hong Duong, Manh
  • Domingos, Elias Fernández
  • Han, The Anh
  • Krellner, Marcus
  • Ogbo, Ndidi Bianca
  • Powers, Simon T.
  • Zimmaro, Filippo

Abstract

There is general agreement that some form of regulation is necessary both for AI creators to be incentivised to develop trustworthy systems, and for users to actually trust those systems. But there is much debate about what form these regulations should take and how they should be implemented. Most work in this area has been qualitative, and has not been able to make formal predictions. Here, we propose that evolutionary game theory can be used to quantitatively model the dilemmas faced by users, AI creators, and regulators, and provide insights into the possible effects of different regulatory regimes. We show that achieving safe AI and user trust requires regulators to be incentivised to regulate effectively. We demonstrate two effective mechanisms. In the first, governments can recognise and reward regulators that do a good job. In that case, if the AI technology is not too risky, some level of safe development and user trust evolves. In the second mechanism, users can condition their trust decision on the effectiveness of the regulators. This leads to effective regulation, and consequently the development of trustworthy AI and user trust, provided that the cost of implementing regulations is not too high. Our findings highlight the importance of considering the effect of different regulatory regimes from an evolutionary game theoretic perspective.

Suggested Citation

  • Alalawi, Zainab & Bova, Paolo & Cimpeanu, Theodor & Di Stefano, Alessandro & Hong Duong, Manh & Domingos, Elias Fernández & Han, The Anh & Krellner, Marcus & Ogbo, Ndidi Bianca & Powers, Simon T. & Zi, 2026. "Trust AI regulation? Discerning users are vital to build trust and effective AI regulation," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 508(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:508:y:2026:i:c:s0096300325003534
    DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2025.129627
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0096300325003534
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.amc.2025.129627?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mckay Jensen & Nicholas Emery-Xu & Robert Trager, 2023. "Industrial Policy for Advanced AI: Compute Pricing and the Safety Tax," Papers 2302.11436, arXiv.org.
    2. van den Bergh, Jeroen C.J.M. & Gowdy, John M., 2009. "A group selection perspective on economic behavior, institutions and organizations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 1-20, October.
    3. Han, The Anh & Lenaerts, Tom & Santos, Francisco C. & Pereira, Luís Moniz, 2022. "Voluntary safety commitments provide an escape from over-regulation in AI development," Technology in Society, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    4. Martin A. Nowak & Akira Sasaki & Christine Taylor & Drew Fudenberg, 2004. "Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations," Nature, Nature, vol. 428(6983), pages 646-650, April.
    5. Blume Lawrence E., 1993. "The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 387-424, July.
    6. Chan, Keith Jin Deng & Papyshev, Gleb & Yarime, Masaru, 2024. "Balancing the tradeoff between regulation and innovation for artificial intelligence: An analysis of top-down command and control and bottom-up self-regulatory approaches," Technology in Society, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    7. Esmat Zaidan & Imad Antoine Ibrahim, 2024. "AI Governance in a Complex and Rapidly Changing Regulatory Landscape: A Global Perspective," Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 11(1), pages 1-18, December.
    8. Jonas Tallberg & Eva Erman & Markus Furendal & Johannes Geith & Mark Klamberg & Magnus Lundgren, 2023. "The Global Governance of Artificial Intelligence: Next Steps for Empirical and Normative Research," Papers 2305.11528, arXiv.org.
    9. Zainab Alalawi & The Anh Han & Yifeng Zeng & Aiman Elragig, 2019. "Pathways to Good Healthcare Services and Patient Satisfaction: An Evolutionary Game Theoretical Approach," Papers 1907.07132, arXiv.org.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Han, Minglong & Liu, Yupeng, 2026. "Dynamic pricing mechanisms for generative artificial intelligence models across heterogeneous scenarios: An evolutionary game and complex network approach," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 516(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Christian Hilbe & Moshe Hoffman & Martin A. Nowak, 2015. "Cooperate without Looking in a Non-Repeated Game," Games, MDPI, vol. 6(4), pages 1-15, September.
    2. Floriana Gargiulo & José J Ramasco, 2012. "Influence of Opinion Dynamics on the Evolution of Games," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 7(11), pages 1-7, November.
    3. Zhao, Yuntong & Du, Yushen, 2021. "Technical standard competition: An ecosystem-view analysis based on stochastic evolutionary game theory," Technology in Society, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    4. Marta C. Couto & Saptarshi Pal, 2023. "Introspection Dynamics in Asymmetric Multiplayer Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 1256-1285, December.
    5. Christian Hilbe & Martin A Nowak & Arne Traulsen, 2013. "Adaptive Dynamics of Extortion and Compliance," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 8(11), pages 1-9, November.
    6. Van Cleve, Jeremy, 2015. "Social evolution and genetic interactions in the short and long term," Theoretical Population Biology, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 2-26.
    7. Flávio L Pinheiro & Vítor V Vasconcelos & Francisco C Santos & Jorge M Pacheco, 2014. "Evolution of All-or-None Strategies in Repeated Public Goods Dilemmas," PLOS Computational Biology, Public Library of Science, vol. 10(11), pages 1-5, November.
    8. Du, Faqi & Fu, Feng, 2013. "Quantifying the impact of noise on macroscopic organization of cooperation in spatial games," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 35-44.
    9. Mobilia, Mauro, 2013. "Evolutionary games with facilitators: When does selection favor cooperation?," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 113-123.
    10. Chen, Yunong & Belmonte, Andrew & Griffin, Christopher, 2021. "Imitation of success leads to cost of living mediated fairness in the Ultimatum Game," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 583(C).
    11. Falk Armin & Kosfeld Michael, 2012. "It's all about Connections: Evidence on Network Formation," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(3), pages 1-36, September.
    12. Szabó, György & Borsos, István & Szombati, Edit, 2019. "Games, graphs and Kirchhoff laws," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 521(C), pages 416-423.
    13. Sergio Currarini & Carmen Marchiori & Alessandro Tavoni, 2016. "Network Economics and the Environment: Insights and Perspectives," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(1), pages 159-189, September.
    14. Michael Kosfeld, 2002. "Stochastic strategy adjustment in coordination games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 20(2), pages 321-339.
    15. Steven N. Durlauf & Yannis M. Ioannides, 2010. "Social Interactions," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 2(1), pages 451-478, September.
    16. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2007:i:19:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Takuya Sekiguchi, 2023. "Fixation Probabilities of Strategies for Trimatrix Games and Their Applications to Triadic Conflict," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 1005-1033, September.
    18. Te Wu & Feng Fu & Long Wang, 2011. "Moving Away from Nasty Encounters Enhances Cooperation in Ecological Prisoner's Dilemma Game," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 6(11), pages 1-7, November.
    19. Zhang, Boyu & Hofbauer, Josef, 2016. "Quantal response methods for equilibrium selection in 2×2 coordination games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 19-31.
    20. Cordes, Christian & Richerson, Peter J. & Schwesinger, Georg, 2010. "How corporate cultures coevolve with the business environment: The case of firm growth crises and industry evolution," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 465-480, December.
    21. Konrad, Kai A. & Morath, Florian, 2020. "The Volunteer’s Dilemma in Finite Populations," CEPR Discussion Papers 15536, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:508:y:2026:i:c:s0096300325003534. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.elsevier.com/applied-mathematics-and-computation .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.