Intergroup-based public goods games in complex networks with leader-driven other-regarding preferences

Conventional evolutionary game models often assume that individuals act only to maximize personal payoffs, yet experimental evidence reveals that many participants display other-regarding preferences (ORP). In this paper, we investigate the evolution of cooperation in Public Goods Games (PGG) on complex networks, incorporating the influence of leader ORP. Traditional PGG models primarily focus on individual-level strategies and often neglect the role of leaders and intergroup competition. This study addresses these gaps by proposing an intergroup-based PGG model that integrates community structure, leader identification, and ORP attenuation based on network distance. The proposed model considers multiple network topologies, including regular networks, small-world networks, random networks, and scale-free networks, to explore how leader ORP intensity, network structure, and resource competition influence group cooperation. Simulation results show that stronger leader ORP intensities significantly promote cooperation, particularly in groups with high ORP and in networks with short average path length. We also demonstrate that social temperature in resource allocation, decay rates of leader ORP, and rewiring probabilities play crucial roles in the evolution of cooperation. Our results provide new insights into collective behavior evolution in social networks, highlighting the importance of leader influence and network structure in fostering cooperation.