IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ecm/emetrp/v78y2010i5p1749-1772.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Monotonicity and Implementability

Author

Listed:
  • Itai Ashlagi
  • Mark Braverman
  • Avinatan Hassidim
  • Dov Monderer

Abstract

Consider an environment with a finite number of alternatives, and agents with private values and quasilinear utility functions. A domain of valuation functions for an agent is a monotonicity domain if every finite-valued monotone randomized allocation rule defined on it is implementable in dominant strategies. We fully characterize the set of all monotonicity domains. Copyright 2010 The Econometric Society.

Suggested Citation

  • Itai Ashlagi & Mark Braverman & Avinatan Hassidim & Dov Monderer, 2010. "Monotonicity and Implementability," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(5), pages 1749-1772, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:78:y:2010:i:5:p:1749-1772
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.3982/ECTA8882
    File Function: link to full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sprumont, Yves, 1998. "Ordinal Cost Sharing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 126-162.
    2. Moulin, Herve & Shenker, Scott, 1992. "Serial Cost Sharing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 1009-1037.
    3. Moulin, Herve, 1995. "On Additive Methods to Share Joint Costs," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, pages 98-99.
    4. Walter Bossert & Arkadii Slinko, 2006. "Relative uncertainty aversion and additively representable set rankings," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, pages 105-122.
    5. Eric J. Friedman, 2004. "Paths and consistency in additive cost sharing," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, pages 501-518.
    6. Moulin, Herve, 1995. "On Additive Methods to Share Joint Costs," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, pages 98-99.
    7. Moulin, Herve & Sprumont, Yves, 2006. "Responsibility and cross-subsidization in cost sharing," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 152-188.
    8. Moulin, Herve & Sprumont, Yves, 2005. "On demand responsiveness in additive cost sharing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 1-35.
    9. Friedman, Eric & Moulin, Herve, 1999. "Three Methods to Share Joint Costs or Surplus," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 275-312.
    10. Yves Sprumont, 2008. "Nearly serial sharing methods," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, pages 155-184.
    11. Martin Shubik, 1962. "Incentives, Decentralized Control, the Assignment of Joint Costs and Internal Pricing," Management Science, INFORMS, pages 325-343.
    12. Sprumont, Yves, 1998. "Ordinal Cost Sharing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 126-162.
    13. Martin Shubik, 1962. "Incentives, Decentralized Control, the Assignment of Joint Costs and Internal Pricing," Management Science, INFORMS, pages 325-343.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Katherine Cuff & Sunghoon Hong & Jesse Schwartz & Quan Wen & John Weymark, 2012. "Dominant strategy implementation with a convex product space of valuations," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 39(2), pages 567-597, July.
    2. Carbajal, Juan Carlos & Ely, Jeffrey C., 2013. "Mechanism design without revenue equivalence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 104-133.
    3. Kos, Nenad & Messner, Matthias, 2013. "Incentive compatibility in non-quasilinear environments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, pages 12-14.
    4. Carbajal, Juan Carlos & Müller, Rudolf, 2015. "Implementability under monotonic transformations in differences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 114-131.
    5. Thierry Marchant & Debasis Mishra, 2015. "Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, pages 433-455.
    6. Mishra, Debasis & Sen, Arunava, 2012. "Robertsʼ Theorem with neutrality: A social welfare ordering approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 283-298.
    7. M. Yenmez, 2015. "Incentive compatible market design with applications," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, pages 543-569.
    8. André Berger & Rudolf Müller & Seyed Hossein Naeemi, 2017. "Characterizing implementable allocation rules in multi-dimensional environments," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(2), pages 367-383, February.
    9. X. Ruiz del Portal, 2012. "Conditions for incentive compatibility in models with multidimensional allocation functions and one-dimensional types," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, pages 311-321.
    10. Carbajal, Juan Carlos & Müller, Rudolf, 2015. "Implementability under monotonic transformations in differences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 114-131.
    11. Dobzinski, Shahar & Nisan, Noam, 2015. "Multi-unit auctions: Beyond Roberts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 14-44.
    12. Paul H. Edelman & John A Weymark, 2017. "Dominant Strategy Implementability, Zero Length Cycles, and Affine Maximizers," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 17-00002, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    13. repec:eee:mateco:v:70:y:2017:i:c:p:29-35 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Mishra, Debasis & Pramanik, Anup & Roy, Souvik, 2014. "Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 103-116.
    15. Archer, Aaron & Kleinberg, Robert, 2014. "Truthful germs are contagious: A local-to-global characterization of truthfulness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 340-366.
    16. Juan Carlos Carbajal & Jeffrey C. Ely, 2012. "Mechanism Design Without Revenue Equivalence," Discussion Papers Series 458, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
    17. M. Bumin Yenmez, 2009. "Incentive Compatible Market Design with Applications," GSIA Working Papers 2013-E21, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
    18. Carbajal, Juan Carlos & McLennan, Andrew & Tourky, Rabee, 2013. "Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 1074-1101.
    19. Berger André & Müller Rudolf & Naeemi Seyed Hossein, 2010. "Path-Monotonicity and Incentive Compatibility," Research Memorandum 035, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:78:y:2010:i:5:p:1749-1772. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/essssea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.