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Controlling a Stochastic Process with Unknown Parameters

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  • Easley, David
  • Kiefer, Nicholas M

Abstract

The problem of controlling a stochastic process, with unknown parameters over an infinite horizon, with discounting is considered. Agents express beliefs about unknown parameters in terms of distributions. Under general conditions, the sequence of beliefs converges to a limit distribution. The limit distribution may or may not be concentrated at the true parameter value. In some cases, complete learning is optimal; in others, the optimal strategy does not imply complete learning. The paper concludes with examination of some special cases and a discussion of a procedure for generating examples in which incomplete learning is optimal. Copyright 1988 by The Econometric Society.

Suggested Citation

  • Easley, David & Kiefer, Nicholas M, 1988. "Controlling a Stochastic Process with Unknown Parameters," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1045-1064, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:56:y:1988:i:5:p:1045-64
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    References listed on IDEAS

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