Do Trade Unions Reduce Job Opportunities of Non-members?
This paper examines the structure of the optimal contract that would be chosen by a self-interested trade union that represents the interests of some set of M members when it is assumed that there exists a pool of unemployed workers outside the union whose opportunity cost of working is such that they would, at least in some states of demand, have been employed in a competitive labor market. The authors compare wage and employment levels under such a contract with those that would be observed in competitive markets, in particular, focusing on the impact of the union on the employment opportunities and welfare of non-union members. Copyright 1989 by Royal Economic Society.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 99 (1989)
Issue (Month): 394 (March)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 2 Dean Trench Street, Westminster, SW1P 3HE|
Phone: +44 20 3137 6301
Web page: http://www.res.org.uk/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.blackwellpublishers.co.uk/asp/journal.asp?ref=0013-0133|