Do Trade Unions Reduce Job Opportunities of Non-members?
This paper examines the structure of the optimal contract that would be chosen by a self-interested trade union that represents the interests of some set of M members when it is assumed that there exists a pool of unemployed workers outside the union whose opportunity cost of working is such that they would, at least in some states of demand, have been employed in a competitive labor market. The authors compare wage and employment levels under such a contract with those that would be observed in competitive markets, in particular, focusing on the impact of the union on the employment opportunities and welfare of non-union members. Copyright 1989 by Royal Economic Society.
Volume (Year): 99 (1989)
Issue (Month): 394 (March)
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