Pareto-Improving Immigration in an Economy with Equilibrium Unemployment
A dynamic two-country labour matching economy is presented. Workers decide whether to search in their native country or look for a job abroad (bearing an additional cost). The number of vacancies posted by firms in each country depends on the average characteristics of the workers searching inside that country. Wages are determined in an individual Nash bargain. We show the existence of multiple steady-state equilibria: one no-migration equilibrium and two migration equilibria. The multiplicity of equilibria is due to a self-fulfilling prophecy phenomenon linking average wages and incentives to migrate. The equilibria are Pareto-ranked, with migration-equilibria dominating no-migration.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 110 (2000)
Issue (Month): 460 (January)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 2 Dean Trench Street, Westminster, SW1P 3HE|
Phone: +44 20 3137 6301
Web page: http://www.res.org.uk/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.blackwellpublishers.co.uk/asp/journal.asp?ref=0013-0133|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:110:y:2000:i:460:p:92-112. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.