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Establishing ownership in a lobbying contest with asymmetric information

Author

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  • Haruki Miyashita

    (Department of Economics, Josai University)

Abstract

We construct an incomplete information-lobbying contest involving a defender of economic interest and an exploiter. The parameters of each lobbyist are characterized such that the defenders' interests are secured without competition. The findings reveal that the ownership of vested interests can be established without third-party arbitration when the defender's preference parameter exceeds a certain threshold, provided that the exploiter's contest competitiveness remains below a fixed level.

Suggested Citation

  • Haruki Miyashita, 2025. "Establishing ownership in a lobbying contest with asymmetric information," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 45(3), pages 1538-1543.
  • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-25-00325
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    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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