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Signalling for electricity demand response: When is truth telling optimal?

Author

Listed:
  • Rene Aid

    (Universite Paris Dauphine)

  • Anupama Kowli

    (Indian Institute of Technology Bombay)

  • Ankur A. Kulkarni

    (Indian Institute of Technology Bomaby)

Abstract

Electricity providers as well as transmission system operators (TSO) around the world implement demand response programs for reducing electricity consumption by sending information on the state of balance between supply demand to end-use consumers. We construct a Bayesian persuasion model to analyse such demand response programs. Using a simple model consisting of two time steps for contract signing and invoking, we analyse the relation between the pricing of electricity and the incentives of an energy provider to garble information about the true state of the generation. We show that if the electricity is priced at its marginal cost of production, the energy provider has no incentive to lie and always tells the truth. On the other hand, we provide conditions where overpricing of electricity leads the energy provider to send no information to the consumer. As a result, in case of electricity mispricing, information provision gives to energy providers a new way to exert market power.

Suggested Citation

  • Rene Aid & Anupama Kowli & Ankur A. Kulkarni, 2025. "Signalling for electricity demand response: When is truth telling optimal?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 45(4), pages 1850-1859.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-25-00271
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Forges, Françoise & Koessler, Frédéric, 2008. "Long persuasion games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 1-35, November.
    2. Claude Crampes & Thomas-Olivier Léautier, 2015. "Demand response in adjustment markets for electricity," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 169-193, October.
    3. René Aïd & Dylan Possamaï & Nizar Touzi, 2022. "Optimal Electricity Demand Response Contracting with Responsiveness Incentives," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 47(3), pages 2112-2137, August.
    4. repec:dau:papers:123456789/179 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. René Aïd & Dylan Possamaï & Nizar Touzi, 2022. "Optimal Electricity Demand Response Contracting with Responsiveness Incentives," Post-Print hal-03670395, HAL.
    6. Ahmad Faruqui & Sanem Sergici, 2010. "Household response to dynamic pricing of electricity: a survey of 15 experiments," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 193-225, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    JEL classification:

    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design

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