IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

Unanimous, reducible, anonymous social choice


  • Antonio Quesada

    () (Universitat Rovira i Virgili)


The problem of aggregating preferences over two alternatives is considered. Three axioms are postulated: unanimity, reducibility (two divergent preferences can be replaced by their aggregation), and anonymity. It is shown that only twelve aggregation rules satisfy the three axioms: the majority rule, two myopic majority rules, three dictated rules (rules that almost always output the same outcome), and six hierarchically dictated rules (the output is determined by some priority ranking among outcomes).

Suggested Citation

  • Antonio Quesada, 2012. "Unanimous, reducible, anonymous social choice," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(1), pages 242-250.
  • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-11-00475

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    More about this item


    Social welfare function; majority rule; axiomatic characterization; two alternatives.;

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-11-00475. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (John P. Conley). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.