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Supermajority Rules and the Swing Voter's Curse


  • Bryan C McCannon

    () (Saint Bonaventure University)


The Swing Voter's Curse is extended to incorporate a class of supermajority rules.

Suggested Citation

  • Bryan C McCannon, 2012. "Supermajority Rules and the Swing Voter's Curse," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(1), pages 698-705.
  • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-11-00307

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Neumeyer, Pablo A. & Perri, Fabrizio, 2005. "Business cycles in emerging economies: the role of interest rates," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 345-380, March.
    2. Stephane Pallage & Michel A. Robe, 2003. "On the Welfare Cost of Economic Fluctuations in Developing Countries," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 44(2), pages 677-698, May.
    3. Gadi Barlevy, 2004. "The Cost of Business Cycles Under Endogenous Growth," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 964-990, September.
    4. Morten O. Ravn & Harald Uhlig, 2002. "On adjusting the Hodrick-Prescott filter for the frequency of observations," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 84(2), pages 371-375.
    5. Robert C. Feenstra & Robert E. Lipsey & Haiyan Deng & Alyson C. Ma & Hengyong Mo, 2005. "World Trade Flows: 1962-2000," NBER Working Papers 11040, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Rudiger Dornbusch & Juan Carlos de Pablo, 1987. "Argentina: Debt and Macroeconomic Instability," NBER Working Papers 2378, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Eberly, Janice C., 1997. "International evidence on investment and fundamentals," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(6), pages 1055-1078, June.
    8. Reinout De Bock, 2010. "The Composition and Cyclical Behavior of Trade Flows in Emerging Economies," IMF Working Papers 10/46, International Monetary Fund.
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    More about this item


    abstention; strategic voting; supermajority rules; swing voter's curse;

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory


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