Manipulation of the Borda rule by introduction of a similar candidate
In an election contest, a losing candidate a can manipulate the election outcome in his favor by introducing a weak similar candidate WSC in the choice set, the WSC b being defined as an alternative which is ranked immediatly below a in the individual preferences. We characterize the voting situations where this manipulation is efficient for the Borda rule and express its vulnerability for a 3 alternative election.
Volume (Year): 31 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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