Wholesale price discrimination and enforcement of regulation
The present paper studied third-degree price discrimination in wholesale markets and its welfare property when a monopolistic manufacturer sells his/her products to two retailers who have different qualities and costs of sales. Our results revealed that price discrimination within a certain extent increases social welfare under some conditions, which would support the soft enforcement of prohibiting price discrimination by a monopolistic wholesaler.
Volume (Year): 30 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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