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Alternate contracts for side payments

Author

Listed:
  • Akira Yamada

    (Sapporo University)

Abstract

We characterize efficient equilibrium outcomes of two-player games that remain equilibrium outcomes even when the two players may alternately make binding offers of strategy contingent side payments before the game is played. Our characterization result implies that alternately contracting for side payments has more efficiency of a certain type in equilibria than simultaneously side contracting which is analyzed by Jackson and Wilkie (2005).

Suggested Citation

  • Akira Yamada, 2005. "Alternate contracts for side payments," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(46), pages 1-5.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-05c70029
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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2005/Volume3/EB-05C70029A.pdf
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Valentin Goranko, 2022. "Preplay Negotiations with Unconditional Offers of Side Payments in Two-Player Strategic-Form Games: Towards Non-Cooperative Cooperation," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 10(14), pages 1-21, July.
    2. Valentin Goranko & Paolo Turrini, 2016. "Two-Player Preplay Negotiation Games with Conditional Offers," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 18(01), pages 1-31, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    alternate contracts;

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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