Some Theoretical Issues Relating to Regulation: The Quasi Autonomous State
Economics of regulation is often considered to be a branch of normative economies, dealing with the way regulatory policy could enhance the efficiency of second best economies. However, the positive theory of regulation seeks to explain regulation as the outcome of lobbying activity of industry (or sector) specific interest groups. This theory attempts to construct equilibrium models wherein the markets for "political goods" (i.e. regulation) clear. The present work attempts to explain situations of quantity-constraints in these markets, which lead to different levels of autonomy for the state vis-a-vis the interest groups. It is argued, that the behavior of transaction costs influences the degree of autonomy for the state.
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Volume (Year): 30 (1995)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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