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Enracinement des actionnaires de contrôle et performance à court terme des fusions-acquisitions en France - The entrenchment of controlling shareholders and the short term performance of mergers and acquisitions in France

Author

Listed:
  • Mohamed Firas Thraya

    (ESCEM (Ecole Supérieure de Commerce et de Management) Tours-Poitiers)

  • Michel M. Albouy

    (Grenoble Ecole de Management)

Abstract

(VF)La concentration de l’actionnariat dans la plupart des pays, notamment en France, a attiré l’attention des chercheurs sur le rôle des actionnaires de contrôle dans l’entreprise. Cet article examine l’impact de l’enracinement des actionnaires de contrôle sur la performance des acquisitions à court terme. L’objectif est d’identifier, à partir de la réaction du marché, les cas où les actionnaires de contrôle utilisent des opérations de fusions-acquisitions pour extraire des bénéfices privés de contrôle. Nos résultats montrent que les principaux facteurs accentuant l’enracinement de l’actionnaire de contrôle comme les droits de vote, la séparation entre la propriété et le contrôle, la fonction dans l’entreprise, le cumul des fonctions, la signature d’une action de concert et l’actionnariat familial ne semblent pas en général affecter la performance à court terme mesurée par les rentabilités anormales cumulées (RAC). Toutefois, au moment où l’entreprise décide de se diversifier, les RAC deviennent significativement plus faibles lorsque l’actionnaire de contrôle détient des droits de vote au-delà de ses droits aux bénéfices ou lorsqu’il cumule les fonctions de la direction générale et de la présidence du conseil.(VA) Concentrated ownership in most countries including France has attracted the attention of researchers toward the role of controlling shareholders in the firm. This article examines the impact of the entrenchment of controlling shareholders on the short term performance of corporate acquisitions. Our purpose is to identify cases in which the controlling shareholders use mergers and acquisitions as a tool to extract private benefits of control. Our results show that main factors favoring the entrenchment like voting rights, the separation of ownership and control, the position within the firm, dual board structure, the signature of a concerted action and family ownership do not affect the market performance as measured by cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). However, once the firm decides to diversify, the CAR becomes significantly lower when controlling shareholders hold voting rights higher than cash-flow rights or when they occupy jointly the CEO and the chairman positions.

Suggested Citation

  • Mohamed Firas Thraya & Michel M. Albouy, 2012. "Enracinement des actionnaires de contrôle et performance à court terme des fusions-acquisitions en France - The entrenchment of controlling shareholders and the short term performance of mergers and a," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 15(4), pages 47-69, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:15:y:2012:i:4:p:47-69
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    actionnaires de contrôle; performance à court terme; fusions-acquisitions; diversification; controlling shareholders; short term performance; mergers-acquisition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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