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The Subjectivity Argument against the Intrinsic Value of Pleasure

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  • Broi, Antonin

Abstract

Pleasure is widely thought to have intrinsic value. However, this thesis has been threatened by the argument that pleasure is a mental state that essentially involves the subject’s conative attitudes. Its value, then, would be subjective. Though the existing version of the argument can be resisted by simply rejecting the attitudinal theories of pleasure on which it is based, I will develop a new and more general version based on the reasonable hypothesis that the phenomenal character of pleasure is reducible to a physical or functional property. If this new version is convincing, then the most promising way to secure the intrinsicality of the value of pleasure and to escape all versions of the subjectivity argument might be to embrace a non-reductionist account of pleasure and its value.

Suggested Citation

  • Broi, Antonin, 2026. "The Subjectivity Argument against the Intrinsic Value of Pleasure," Utilitas, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(2), pages 119-128, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:utilit:v:38:y:2026:i:2:p:119-128_3
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