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Rule Consequentialism and Demandingness: The Wrong Solution(s)?

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  • Sauchelli, Andrea

Abstract

A textbook objection to consequentialism is that it is too demanding—on the assumption that a moral theory which is excessively demanding thereby loses plausibility. In this paper, I assess whether the mechanisms employed by two versions of rule consequentialism, those of Brad Hooker and Tim Mulgan, adequately meet the requirement of not being too demanding. I also examine whether the concept of human nature might help determine what should count as demanding for a moral theory. While this suggestion also faces significant challenges, I contend that prescribing less partiality towards the present generation may not be a drawback for the consequentialist frameworks under consideration.

Suggested Citation

  • Sauchelli, Andrea, 2025. "Rule Consequentialism and Demandingness: The Wrong Solution(s)?," Utilitas, Cambridge University Press, vol. 37(3), pages 211-224, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:utilit:v:37:y:2025:i:3:p:211-224_3
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