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Consequentialism and Moral Worth

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  • SHARADIN, NATHANIEL

Abstract

Sometimes, agents do the right thing for the right reason. What's the normative significance of this phenomenon? According to proponents of the special status view, when an agent acts for the right reason, her actions enjoy a special normative status, namely, worthiness. Proponents of this view claim that self-effacing forms of consequentialism cannot say this plausible thing, and, worse, are blocked from having a perspicuous view of matters by the self-effacing nature of their consequentialism. In this article, I argue that this claim is based on an illicit assumption. I show that whatever version of the special status view proponents of that view prefer, self-effacing consequentialists can adopt a version of it. Moreover, I show that proponents of extant versions of the special status view have reason to prefer the specific version of that view I articulate on behalf of self-effacing consequentialists.

Suggested Citation

  • Sharadin, Nathaniel, 2019. "Consequentialism and Moral Worth," Utilitas, Cambridge University Press, vol. 31(2), pages 117-136, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:utilit:v:31:y:2019:i:02:p:117-136_00
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