The Rejection of Scalar Consequentialism

In ‘The Scalar Approach to Utilitarianism’ Alastair Norcross argues that scalar consequentialism is the most plausible form of consequentialism, but his arguments are flawed: he is simply mistaken when he suggests that there is a problem with deriving absolutes like right and wrong from gradable properties such as goodness; he cannot justify his claim that the choice of a threshold will always be arbitrary; and his ‘no significant difference’ argument only shows that the consequentialist doesn't care about permissibility. Furthermore, I argue that, although Norcross was right to claim that a scalar theory can be action-guiding (to an extent), he was mistaken to think that ‘Abolishing the notion of “ought†will not seriously undermine the action-guiding nature of morality.’ If anything can be said in favour of scalar consequentialism, it is only that it is the most honest form of consequentialism, because it doesn't pretend to care about permissibility.