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Immodest Consequentialism and Character

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  • Smith, Michael

Abstract

The fact that we place the value that we do on the traits of character constitutive of being a good friend, and the acts that good friends are disposed to perform, creates a considerable problem for what I call ‘immodest global consequentialism’. The problem is, in essence, that the very best that the immodest global consequentialists can do by way of vindicating our most deeply held convictions about the value of these traits of character and actions isn't good enough, because, while vindicating our possession of those convictions, the attempted vindication undermines the truth of the convictions thus possessed. This is especially bad news because, as I argue, immodest global consequentialism is the only version of consequentialism that can be distinguished in any principled way from a form of non-consequentialism.

Suggested Citation

  • Smith, Michael, 2001. "Immodest Consequentialism and Character," Utilitas, Cambridge University Press, vol. 13(2), pages 173-194, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:utilit:v:13:y:2001:i:02:p:173-194_00
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