IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/polals/v22y2014i03p374-397_01.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Strategy and Sample Selection: A Strategic Selection Estimator

Author

Listed:
  • Leemann, Lucas

Abstract

The development and proliferation of strategic estimators has narrowed the gap between theoretical models and empirical testing. But despite recent contributions that extend the basic strategic estimator, researchers have continued to neglect a classic social science phenomenon: selection. Compared to nonstrategic estimators, strategic models are even more prone to selection effects. First, external shocks or omitted variables can lead to correlated errors. Second, because the systematic parts of actors' utilities usually overlap on certain key variables, the two sets of explanatory variables are correlated. As a result, both the systematic and the stochastic components can be correlated. However, given that the estimates for the first mover are computed based on the potentially biased predicted probabilities of the second actor, we also generate biased estimates for the first actor. In applied work, researchers neglect the potential shortcomings due to selection bias. This article presents an alternative strategic estimator that takes selection into account and allows scholars to obtain consistent, unbiased, and efficient estimates in the presence of both selection and strategic action. I present a Monte Carlo analysis as well as a real-world application to illustrate the superior performance of this estimator relative to the standard practice.

Suggested Citation

  • Leemann, Lucas, 2014. "Strategy and Sample Selection: A Strategic Selection Estimator," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(3), pages 374-397, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:polals:v:22:y:2014:i:03:p:374-397_01
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S104719870001398X/type/journal_article
    File Function: link to article abstract page
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Emile van Ommeren & Arlo Poletti & Dirk De Bièvre, 2021. "The European Union and the political economy of enforcing international trade rules," European Union Politics, , vol. 22(3), pages 377-400, September.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cup:polals:v:22:y:2014:i:03:p:374-397_01. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Kirk Stebbing (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cambridge.org/pan .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.