IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/jfinqa/v61y2026i4p1841-1880_9.html

Insiders’ Information Advantage: Evidence from Competition with Short Sellers

Author

Listed:
  • Contreras, Harold
  • Fidrmuc, Jana P.
  • Kozhan, Roman

Abstract

We study the information content of corporate insiders’ trades after earnings announcements. We find little evidence that insiders trade on foreknowledge of material information in the post-SOX period. Conditioning on short-selling activity as a proxy for demand of arbitrageurs who exploit short-term mispricing, we show that insiders profit from selling because of their ability to exploit short-term mispricing after earnings releases. In contrast before SOX, insiders do take advantage of foreknowledge of material information while selling. Insider purchases are based on foreknowledge of material information both before and after SOX, but they are rare and have small economic magnitude.

Suggested Citation

  • Contreras, Harold & Fidrmuc, Jana P. & Kozhan, Roman, 2026. "Insiders’ Information Advantage: Evidence from Competition with Short Sellers," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 61(4), pages 1841-1880, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:61:y:2026:i:4:p:1841-1880_9
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0022109025102287/type/journal_article
    File Function: link to article abstract page
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:61:y:2026:i:4:p:1841-1880_9. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Kirk Stebbing (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cambridge.org/jfq .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.