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Nexus Effect: Unraveling the Impact of Political Patronage Connections on Corporate Investment

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  • Guo, Ping
  • Shi, Guifeng
  • Tian, Gary Gang

Abstract

This study investigates how political patronage influences local firms’ investment decisions in China, focusing on changes in patronage ties resulting from provincial leadership turnover. By examining prefectural officials with connections to their provincial superiors, we find that firms in these regions experience increased investment expenditures, albeit with reduced efficiency. This effect is primarily driven by stronger promotion incentives for local officials, bolstered by favoritism from provincial patrons. While political patronage helps address agency problems within political hierarchies, our findings highlight its adverse economic impact due to misaligned interests between politicians and the public.

Suggested Citation

  • Guo, Ping & Shi, Guifeng & Tian, Gary Gang, 2025. "Nexus Effect: Unraveling the Impact of Political Patronage Connections on Corporate Investment," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(8), pages 4035-4064, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:60:y:2025:i:8:p:4035-4064_13
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