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The Unintended Consequences of the Launch of the Single Supervisory Mechanism in Europe

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  • Fiordelisi, Franco
  • Ricci, Ornella
  • Stentella Lopes, Francesco Saverio

Abstract

The launch of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) was an historic event. Beginning in Nov. 2014, the most significant banks came under the direct supervision of the European Central Bank (ECB), while national supervisory authorities (NSAs) maintained direct supervision of the remaining banks. Thus, supervision is conducted on two levels, which could cause inconsistency problems. Did the behavior of the significant banks differ from that of the less significant banks during the SSM launch? We find that the significant banks reduced their lending activity more than the less significant banks did in order to shrink their balance sheets and increase their capitalization.

Suggested Citation

  • Fiordelisi, Franco & Ricci, Ornella & Stentella Lopes, Francesco Saverio, 2017. "The Unintended Consequences of the Launch of the Single Supervisory Mechanism in Europe," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 52(6), pages 2809-2836, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:52:y:2017:i:06:p:2809-2836_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Martynova, Natalya & Vogel, Ursula, 2022. "Banks’ complexity-risk nexus and the role of regulation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).
    2. Avignone, Giuseppe & Altunbas, Yener & Polizzi, Salvatore & Reghezza, Alessio, 2021. "Centralised or decentralised banking supervision? Evidence from European banks," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
    3. Michael Sigmund & Kevin Zimmermann, 2021. "Determinants of Contingent Convertible Bond Coupon Rates of Banks: An Empirical Analysis," Working Papers 236, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank).
    4. Yener Altunbaş & Salvatore Polizzi & Enzo Scannella & John Thornton, 2022. "European Banking Union and bank risk disclosure: the effects of the Single Supervisory Mechanism," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 58(2), pages 649-683, February.
    5. Elena Carletti & Giovanni Dell’Ariccia & Robert Marquez, 2021. "Supervisory Incentives in a Banking Union," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(1), pages 455-470, January.
    6. Ampudia, Miguel & Beck, Thorsten & Beyer, Andreas & Colliard, Jean-Edouard & Leonello, Agnese & Maddaloni, Angela & Marqués-Ibáñez, David, 2019. "The architecture of supervision," Working Paper Series 2287, European Central Bank.
    7. Iryna Okolelova & Jacob A. Bikker, 2022. "The single supervisory mechanism: Competitive implications for the banking sectors in the euro area," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(2), pages 1818-1835, April.
    8. Vincenzo D'Apice & Franco Fiordelisi & Giovanni W. Puopolo, 2020. "Judicial Efficiency and Lending Quality," CSEF Working Papers 588, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    9. Avgeri, I. & Dendramis, Y. & Louri, H., 2021. "The Single Supervisory Mechanism and its implications for the profitability of European banks," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    10. Molyneux, Philip & Reghezza, Alessio & Xie, Ru, 2019. "Bank margins and profits in a world of negative rates," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 1-1.
    11. Myriam García-Olalla & Manuel Luna, 2021. "Market reaction to supranational banking supervision in Europe: Do firm- and country-specific factors matter?," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 48(4), pages 947-975, November.
    12. Koetter, Michael & Krause, Thomas & Sfrappini, Eleonora & Tonzer, Lena, 2021. "Completing the European Banking Union: Capital cost consequences for credit providers and corporate borrowers," IWH Discussion Papers 4/2021, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
    13. Nicolas Soenen & Rudi Vander Vennet, 2021. "Determinants of European Banks’ Default Risk," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 21/1033, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
    14. Fiordelisi, Franco & Pennacchi, George & Ricci, Ornella, 2020. "Are contingent convertibles going-concern capital?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 43(C).
    15. Brunella Bruno & Immacolata Marino, 2018. "How Do Banks Respond to Non-Performing Loans?," CSEF Working Papers 513, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 30 Jul 2021.
    16. Di Fabio, Costanza & Ramassa, Paola & Quagli, Alberto, 2021. "Income smoothing in European banks: The contrasting effects of monitoring mechanisms," Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, Elsevier, vol. 43(C).

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