IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/jfinqa/v48y2013i04p1271-1300_00.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Divisible Good Auctions with Asymmetric Information: An Experimental Examination

Author

Listed:
  • Morales-Camargo, Emmanuel
  • Sade, Orly
  • Schnitzlein, Charles
  • Zender, Jaime F.

Abstract

An experimental approach is used to compare bidding behavior and auction performance in uniform-price and discriminatory auctions when there is incomplete information concerning the common value of the auctioned good. In a symmetric information environment, the different auction formats provide the same average revenue. However, when information is asymmetric the discriminatory auction results in higher average revenue than the uniform-price auction. The volatility of revenue is higher in the uniform-price auctions in all treatments. The results, therefore, provide support for the use of the discriminatory format. Subject characteristics and measures of experience in recent auctions are found to be useful in explaining bidding behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Morales-Camargo, Emmanuel & Sade, Orly & Schnitzlein, Charles & Zender, Jaime F., 2013. "Divisible Good Auctions with Asymmetric Information: An Experimental Examination," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(4), pages 1271-1300, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:48:y:2013:i:04:p:1271-1300_00
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0022109013000409/type/journal_article
    File Function: link to article abstract page
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Bernhard Kasberger & Kyle Woodward, 2021. "Bidding in Multi-Unit Auctions under Limited Information," Papers 2112.11320, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.
    2. Hadar Gafni & Dan Marom & Alicia Robb & Orly Sade, 0. "Gender Dynamics in Crowdfunding (Kickstarter): Evidence on Entrepreneurs, Backers, and Taste-Based Discrimination," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 25(2), pages 235-274.
    3. Mariño, Eduardo Anthony G. & Marszalec, Daniel, 2023. "Strategic supply management and mechanism choice in government debt auctions: An empirical analysis from the Philippines," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:48:y:2013:i:04:p:1271-1300_00. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Kirk Stebbing (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cambridge.org/jfq .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.