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Are Shareholder Proposals All Bark and No Bite? Evidence from Shareholder Resolutions to Rescind Poison Pills

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  • Bizjak, John M.
  • Marquette, Christopher J.

Abstract

We provide a comprehensive examination of shareholder resolutions to rescind poison pills. We find that pill rescission proposals are more frequent the more negative the market reaction to the initial pill adoption and the lower the insider and unaffiliated block ownership. Votes for such a proposal increase when performance is poor and for more onerous poison pills. While we document a stock price decline associated with the proposal announcements, we find poison pills are more likely to be restructured or rescinded when there is a shareholder resolution. Moreover, pill revisions are associated with stockholder wealth increases. Collectively, our results suggest that pill rescission proposals are more frequent when the pill is more likely to harm shareholders and that managers respond to shareholder proposals.

Suggested Citation

  • Bizjak, John M. & Marquette, Christopher J., 1998. "Are Shareholder Proposals All Bark and No Bite? Evidence from Shareholder Resolutions to Rescind Poison Pills," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 33(04), pages 499-521, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:33:y:1998:i:04:p:499-521_00
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    1. De Schepper, A. & Teunen, M. & Goovaerts, M., 1994. "An analytical inversion of a Laplace transform related to annuities certain," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 33-37, April.
    2. J. A. Nielsen & K. Sandmann, 1996. "The pricing of Asian options under stochastic interest rates," Applied Mathematical Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 3(3), pages 209-236.
    3. Alziary, Benedicte & Decamps, Jean-Paul & Koehl, Pierre-Francois, 1997. "A P.D.E. approach to Asian options: analytical and numerical evidence," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 21(5), pages 613-640, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Romano, Roberta, 2002. "Does Confidential Proxy Voting Matter?," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt9z88z4th, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    2. Roberta Romano, 2002. "Does Confidential Proxy Voting Matter?," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm300, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Feb 2003.
    3. Chris Mallin & Andrea Melis, 2012. "Shareholder rights, shareholder voting, and corporate performance," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 16(2), pages 171-176, May.
    4. Renneboog, Luc & Szilagyi, Peter G., 2011. "The role of shareholder proposals in corporate governance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 167-188, February.
    5. Vincent C. Ma & John S. Liu, 2016. "Exploring the research fronts and main paths of literature: a case study of shareholder activism research," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 109(1), pages 33-52, October.
    6. Laura Henning, 2015. "Shareholder voting and merger returns," Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, Springer;Swiss Society for Financial Market Research, pages 337-363.
    7. Renneboog, L.D.R. & Szilagyi, P.G., 2009. "Shareholder Activism through the Proxy Process," Discussion Paper 2009-65, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    8. Choi, Woon-Youl & Cho, Sung Hoon, 2003. "Shareholder activism in Korea: An analysis of PSPD's activities," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, pages 349-363.
    9. Wang, Yong & Mao, Connie X., 2015. "Shareholder activism of public pension funds: The political facet," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 138-152.
    10. Carine Girard, 2001. "Une typologie de l'activisme des actionnaires minoritaires en France," Working Papers CREGO 1010101, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    11. Danielson, Morris G. & Karpoff, Jonathan M., 2006. "Do pills poison operating performance?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 536-559, June.
    12. repec:eee:empfin:v:43:y:2017:i:c:p:185-202 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Thomas, Randall S. & Cotter, James F., 2007. "Shareholder proposals in the new millennium: Shareholder support, board response, and market reaction," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(2-3), pages 368-391, June.
    14. Jean-Sebastien Lantz & Sophie Montandrau & Jean-Michel Sahut, 2014. "Activism of Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance Alerts and Financial Performance," Working Papers 2014-353, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.
    15. repec:eee:corfin:v:44:y:2017:i:c:p:405-424 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Del Guercio, Diane & Seery, Laura & Woidtke, Tracie, 2008. "Do boards pay attention when institutional investor activists "just vote no"?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 84-103, October.
    17. Cziraki, P. & Renneboog, L.D.R. & Szilagyi, P.G., 2009. "Shareholder Activism through Proxy Proposals : The European Perspective," Discussion Paper 2009-44, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    18. Roberta Romano, 2002. "Does Confidential Proxy Voting Matter?," NBER Working Papers 9126, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Hadani, Michael & Goranova, Maria & Khan, Raihan, 2011. "Institutional investors, shareholder activism, and earnings management," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 64(12), pages 1352-1360.
    20. Szilagyi, P.G., 2007. "Corporate governance and the agency costs of debt and outside equity," Other publications TiSEM 9520d40a-224f-43a8-9bf9-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.

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