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When Do Conflicting Parties Share Political Power?

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  • Battaglini, Marco
  • Mechtenberg, Lydia

Abstract

We conduct a laboratory experiment to study the incentives of a privileged group (the “yellows†) to share political power with another group (the “blues†). The yellows collectively choose the voting rule for a general election: a simple-majority rule that favors them, or a proportional rule. In two treatments, the blues can use a costly punishment option. We find that the yellows share power voluntarily only to a small extent, but they are more inclined to do so under the threat of punishment, despite the fact that punishments are not sub-game perfect. The blue group conditions punishments both on the voting rule and the electoral outcome.

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  • Battaglini, Marco & Mechtenberg, Lydia, 2015. "When Do Conflicting Parties Share Political Power?," Journal of Experimental Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 139-151, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jexpos:v:2:y:2015:i:02:p:139-151_00
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