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Incentives That (Could Have) Saved Lives: Government Regulation of Accident Insurance Associations in Germany, 1884–1914

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  • Guinnane, Timothy W.
  • Streb, Jochen

Abstract

Germany introduced compulsory industrial accident insurance in 1884. The accident-insurance system compensated injured workers and survivors for losses, but initially failed to limit the growth of accident rates. We trace this failure to the 1884 law's faulty incentives and to an initial unwillingness to use the tools built into the law. The government regulator increasingly stressed rules that forced firms to adopt specific safety-enhancing innovations and practices. Econometric analysis shows that more consistent use of the rules and the limited incentives available under the law would have reduced industrial accidents earlier and more extensively.

Suggested Citation

  • Guinnane, Timothy W. & Streb, Jochen, 2015. "Incentives That (Could Have) Saved Lives: Government Regulation of Accident Insurance Associations in Germany, 1884–1914," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 75(4), pages 1196-1227, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jechis:v:75:y:2015:i:04:p:1196-1227_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Felix Kersting, 2022. "Welfare Reform and Repression in an Autocracy: Bismarck and the Socialists," Working Papers 0227, European Historical Economics Society (EHES).
    2. Guinnane, Timothy & Streb, Jochen, 2019. "Bismarck to no Effect: Fertility Decline and the Introduction of Social Insurance in Prussia," Working Papers 13, German Research Foundation's Priority Programme 1859 "Experience and Expectation. Historical Foundations of Economic Behaviour", Humboldt University Berlin.
    3. Lehmann-Hasemeyer, Sibylle H. & Streb, Jochen, 2016. "Does Social Security Crowd Out Private Savings? The Case of Bismarck’s System of Social Insurance," Working Papers 1, German Research Foundation's Priority Programme 1859 "Experience and Expectation. Historical Foundations of Economic Behaviour", Humboldt University Berlin.
    4. Timothy W. Guinnane & Tobias A. Jopp & Jochen Streb, 2021. "Bismarcks Sozialversicherung und ihr Einfluss auf Deutschlands demografischen Wandel," Wirtschaftsdienst, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 101(4), pages 262-265, April.
    5. Lehmann-Hasemeyer, Sibylle & Streb, Jochen, 2017. "Does Social Security crowd out Private Savings? The Case of Bismarck’s System of Social Insurance," IBF Paper Series 06-17, IBF – Institut für Bank- und Finanzgeschichte / Institute for Banking and Financial History, Frankfurt am Main.

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