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On the Design of a Regulatory System

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  • McLaughlin, Patrick A.
  • Richards, Tyler

Abstract

We briefly describe the structure of a regulatory system that alleviates many of the problems that arise when elected officials delegate rulemaking authority to government agencies. These problems include principal-agent issues, monopoly provision, information asymmetry, and tragedy of the commons. This structure better aligns the incentives of regulators with those of legislators and with the well-being of the public. We intend the solutions and process structure presented here not to serve as a collection of proposed changes but as guideposts for those hoping to make any part of the regulatory system better attuned to the needs of the populace.

Suggested Citation

  • McLaughlin, Patrick A. & Richards, Tyler, 2025. "On the Design of a Regulatory System," Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(S1), pages 139-143, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:jbcoan:v:16:y:2025:i:s1:p:139-143_10
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