Bioprospecting and biodiversity contracts
An economic model for a biodiversity prospecting contract, between a developing country and a pharmaceutical company is developed. The theoretical model is compared with observed contracts and those being developed by biodiversity expects. It is found that these contracts roughly reflect the character of the economic model, although due to asymmetric information and risk aversion, the contracts are often second-best.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
Volume (Year): 8 (2003)
Issue (Month): 03 (July)
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